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Abstract 
World Bank inspired analysis of corruption in the public sector is coloured by the 
underlying push for market solutions. Behind its criminology lies neo-liberal political 
economy.  In this case study the forms of white-collar crime within the EMCALI 
municipal services corporation are identified, as are the remedies to counteract them.  
A significant new ingredient is present: the workers in the state sector. The trade 
union SINTRAEMCALI adopted anti-corruption as an integral component of its 
broader campaign to stop privatisation, thus planting the germs of an alternative social 
vision. This has consequences for the issue of agency in combating white-collar 
crime: the state or social movements?  
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“the non-ruling factions of the French bourgeoisie cried: Corruption! The people 
cried: Down with the big thieves! Down with the assassins!” (Marx , [1850] 1978: 50-
51) 
 
Introduction 
 
World Bank inspired analysis of corruption in the public sector is coloured by the underlying 
push for market solutions. Behind its criminology lies neo-liberal political economy. 
 
In this case study the forms of white-collar crime within the EMCALI municipal services 
corporation are identified, as are the remedies to counteract them. A significant new 
ingredient is present: the workers in the state sector. The trade union SINTRAEMCALI 
adopted anti-corruption as an integral component of its broader campaign to stop 
privatisation, thus planting the germs of an alternative social vision. This has consequences 
for the issue of agency in combating white-collar crime, the state or social movements?  
 
Theories of Public Sector Corruption 
International Context and Working Definition 
 
The issue of corruption is a top agenda item in the international community. The ‘corruption 
eruption’ marked by a series of conferences in the late 1990s has since worked its way 
through the international institutions, and in 2003 the General Assembly adopted the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption:   
 
“a) to promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more 
efficiently and effectively;  
(b) To promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical 
assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset 
recovery;  
(c) To promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and 
public property.” (UNODC, 2003: 2) 
      
Although the emphasis is on action by signatory states, the Convention encourages civil 
society actors to assist in the fight against corruption as well.  
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The Convention does not offer a definition of corruption, although the above quoted purposes 
combine important elements. Corruption is a contested concept, and the literature is full of 
definitional debates. A working definition used by the World Bank that corruption ‘is the 
abuse of public power for private benefit’ has the advantage of simplicity, if not 
completeness. As Tanzi (1998: 564) points out, corruption also exists in private corporations, 
e.g. in procurement activities, and in state regulated private sector activities.  
 
The World Bank’s Rent-Seeking Paradigm of Corruption 
 
The theoretical foundation of what was to become the World Bank’s approach to corruption 
in underdeveloped countries was established by Krueger (1974)1, according to which rent 
seeking occurs when an interest group tries to gain access to state protected monopoly profits 
to gain an income that could not be obtained on the open market. In Krueger’s conception 
rent-seeking diverts resources from productive activities to unproductive ones, and therefore 
carries a social cost.  
 
Rent-seeking involves a range of practices such as lobbying for the interests of a private 
group that are legal, if not always moral.  In this paradigm, corruption occurs when rent-
seeking steps from legal lobbying into illegal forms of using public office for private gain. 
Other work leading this field fits squarely in the rent-seeking paradigm. Rose-Ackerman, for 
example, distinguishes between “productive economic activity and unproductive rent 
seeking” (1999: 2) – see also (Klitgaard, 1998; Tanzi, 1998; Mauro, 2002). These works from 
the ‘organic intellectuals’ of the World Bank and IMF are carried out in the context of the 
pro-privatisation policies of these institutions. 2 They are also in line with the modernisation 
paradigm of development: the view is that of the reformer overcoming traditional and cultural 
obstacles to efficient modernisation. The blatant anti-social results of wholesale privatisation 
in Russia and Eastern Europe obliged a modification of the view, and from 1997 onwards 
there was a new emphasis on improving how privatisation was to be carried out by getting the 
regulating institutions right. This policy shift to a post-Washington consensus was reflected in 
the academic literature on corruption, taking into account the need to establish a credible 
privatisation process – “privatization is both an anti-corruption reform and a new potential 
source of corrupt gains” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999: 42). Stiglitz’s admission is more forthright – 
                                                 
1 Krueger was appointed chief economist at the World Bank in 1981, and later became First 
Deputy Managing Director at the IMF. 
2 Rose-Ackerman was attached to the World Bank’s Private Provision of Public Services 
Unit. 
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“Russia provides a devastating case study of the harm of privatization at all costs’” (2002: 
58).  
 
Why does corruption matter? A developing country may be caught in a ‘corruption trap’ in 
which illegal actors have a comparative advantage, encouraging excessive public investment 
and reducing total investment. Corruption acts as a tax on foreign direct investment, 
discouraging its entry (Rose-Ackerman, 1999: 2, 3). It is at this point especially when, like 
rent-seeking, corruption becomes an obstacle to development, viz. the entry of multinational 
capital, that it becomes “too important a phenomenon to be left to moralists" (Ruggiero, 2000: 
110).  
 
How to reduce corruption? Attempts at reform are on the basis of controlling rent-seeking 
behaviour. This is summed up by the notion that “Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion 
minus accountability” (Klitgaard, 1988). It follows from this that systemic corruption can be 
reduced by introducing competition to eliminate monopoly; by regulation to limit the 
discretionary powers of officials, and by mechanisms of accountability to achieve 
transparency. Structural reforms aimed at rationalising the role of the state, increasing the 
reliance on market-based pricing and creating a sound regulatory environment should 
contribute to growth directly, and indirectly by lowering the incidence of corruption. (Mauro, 
2002)  
 
Moving from the economics of corruption to its mode of operation, the literature generally 
follows Klitgaard’s descriptive model of principal-agent-client. The principal is essentially 
the executive of the state – the government, the agent is an agent of the state - the officials in 
its bureaucracy, and the client is the private third party. A corrupt exchange, e.g. bribe, takes 
place between agent and client. The principal must evaluate costs and benefits of different 
anti-corruption measures (Klitgaard, 1988).  Note that to effect organisational changes to the 
system, the principal is the active policy agent. 
 
There are two problematic issues for this perspective, even within its own terms. Firstly, there 
is the issue of political agency.  Low level corruption can be considered as a breach of 
contract between the agent and the principal (Colombatto, 2001). The principal-agent-client 
model implies top-down solutions to corruption, which becomes complicated when the 
corruption is top down, i.e. the commanding principal presides over and benefits from a 
corrupt system. This has led to the notion of state capture, that is: 
 
 “the actions of individuals, groups, or firms in both the public and private sectors to 
influence the formulation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies 
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to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of 
private benefits to public officials” (Gray, Hellman and Ryterman, 2004: 10).  
 
But this is incomplete to cover the range of top-down corruption, which in its extreme form is 
far more than influence, as demonstrated in those kleptocracies (e.g. Mobutu’s Zaire, 
Duvalier’s Haiti, Stroessner’s Paraguay) where corruption is organised from the top. Here, 
the state is an instrument of looting society in the interests of a ruling clique (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999: 114-121; Bayart, Ellisand and Hibou, 1999). In a kleptocracy, enterprises may be 
public or private, serving to generate income for a faction, rather than the needs of capital as a 
whole or society as a whole.  
 
Rose-Ackerman distinguishes the supply side and demand side of the bribery “market”, both 
of which can be dimensioned in terms of their degree of monopoly.  She identifies the case of 
the bilateral monopoly, where bribe recipients concentrated at the top of the political structure 
face a private monopoly, e.g. where there is economic dependency “on the export of one or 
two minerals or agricultural products” such that  “the country becomes an appendage of the 
large investor” (ibid.: 122). Another case occurs where the state is weak and monopoly 
economic power lies outside it, such that “the private power dominates the state, buying the 
cooperation of officials” (ibid.: 123).  It would seem that the principal-agent-client model is 
limited in scope, it does not fit the latter case at all, where powerful corporations or the Mafia 
are not the clients, but in effective command of a client state.  
  
The second issue is the extension of the rent-seeking paradigm of corruption from the 
economic and political into the social domain.  The modernisation-developmental challenge 
provides new motivation for studying corruption as a harmful social problem.  The notion of 
limiting the discretion of state agents is close to the Weberian view that the state bureaucracy 
should function according to universal rules. But in a corrupt, rule-breaking environment no 
individual official will cease being corrupt unless there is trust that the others will do likewise 
- even if there is a general benefit in so doing, there is no individual incentive.  Mauro 
observes that “some countries appear to be stuck in a bad equilibrium characterized by 
pervasive corruption with no sign of improvement”  (2002: 3). As well as this ‘bad 
equilibrium’ vicious cycle, there may be a  ‘good equilibrium’ of low corruption and high 
growth, setting off a virtuous cycle. Policies of good governance need to be found to shift a 
country trapped in one cycle to the other.  
 
The theory of corruption is increasingly linked to the theory of social capital.  The usage by 
the World Bank (2004) oscillates between social capital as resource (attribute of individual or 
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family) and social capital as social trust (quality of a wider social group).  This definitional 
tension is developed into a distinction between bonding social capital and bridging social 
capital. Bonding social capital refers to “tight-knit, homogeneous groups of people that 
provide important safety nets for one another in times of crisis”. Bridging social capital refers 
to “horizontal networks of more heterogeneous people or groups that enable members to 
access additional, diverse resources and information”.  Furthermore social capital is, 
according to the World Bank, “a resource which can be used for good or bad”. Bad social 
capital “can serve perverse functions leading to nepotism, corruption, ethnocentrism, mafias 
and/or stringent social controls”. Interestingly, the notion of perverse social capital originates 
in Colombia  (Rubio, 1997).  
 
How does the concept of social capital inform theoretical understanding of corruption? Della 
Porta finds that political corruption operates through informal norms, reciprocity and 
networks. She links the effective workings of this ‘bad’ social capital with the ‘bad 
equilibrium’ condition, connecting the social malaise with a sub-optimum economic state. 
Della Porta finds an association between high levels of corruption and low satisfaction with 
democracy. Corruption is both a cause and an effect of poor government performance,   
 
“Lack of confidence in government actually favors corruption insofar as it transforms 
citizens into clients and bribers who look for private protection to gain access to 
decision-makers.” (2000: 205) 
 
‘Bad’ social capital and political corruption are seen here as characteristic of disaffected 
democracies.  
 
Critique and the Basis for an Alternative Paradigm  
 
From the critical criminology perspective, Ruggiero observes that corruption resembles some 
forms of corporate crime in that they are apparently victimless crimes.  In an analysis of 
political and administrative corruption in Italy, he considers key issues of impunity and the 
commodification of rights that are germane to this investigation (Ruggiero, 2000: Chapter 7).   
 
This work notwithstanding, it has to be admitted that theoretical critique of the dominant rent-
seeking / privatisation / bad social capital paradigm of corruption is in its infancy, and has not 
yet matured into a full grown alternative interpretive paradigm.  Two lines of critique have 
been adopted. One is to expose the neo-liberal interests driving the dominant discourse on 
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corruption; as done comprehensively and convincingly by Williams and Beare (2003). The 
other line of critique is focussed on the World Bank version of the concept of social capital. 
Fine (2001) argues that a disciplinary colonisation of social science is taking place, and calls 
for a rejection of social capital as bridgehead of the invasion. Schuurman’s critique is more 
adaptive, he wishes to explore “the politico-emancipatory potential” of the disputed concept 
of social capital, arguing that the concept may be turned towards “possibilities of 
reconnecting the social with the political” (2003: 989,1008).  This chapter will employ the 
case study to explore Fine and Schuurman’s suggestions, and to see if ‘social capital’ in 
modified form warrants the proposed rehabilitation.  
 
However questionable the motives behind the turn of the international organisations to this 
phenomenon, one cannot argue that corruption is not a pressing problem in the Third World. 
A critique of the dominant discourse on corruption is necessary but insufficient, given the 
phenomenon’s presence. Transparency International’s Global Corruption Index is based on 
aggregates from various northern based surveys.  It has clear groupings with OECD (‘First 
World’) countries clustered around the top positions as least corrupt, the next band occupied 
by Eastern Europe and unusual mini-states (‘Second World’) and the long tail of corrupt 
countries – the forever last Third World (Lamsdorf, 2004: 284 -286).  
 
Another source of empirical evidence, a victimisation survey carried out in nine 
underdeveloped countries in 1992, reports that consumer fraud is the most commonly 
experienced crime, followed closely in most cases by corruption by government officials. 
Significantly, the indices for these two forms of ‘white-collar crime’ were both much higher 
than reported in official criminal statistics. While attempts are made by states to make it 
invisible, corruption is not a victimless crime in these societies. It goes to the heart of the 
form of relation between state and society in the underdeveloped world. The report’s authors 
comment: 
 
“Both victimisations indicate much more than the sheer sphere of conventional crime; 
they speak about development itself, of the citizens' position vis-a-vis government 
and commercial/service activities, the lack of consumer/client and citizen protection, 
and the ways in which people go about, or are made to go about, in satisfying their 
needs and rights.”  (Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate, 1993: 58) 
 
The report sketches a scene worse than disaffected democracy, societies where the general 
populace suffers predations by those in official public and private institutions. White-collar 
predation may even be a characteristic feature of underdevelopment.  
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 There is some evidence that the level of administrative corruption is inversely related to the 
salaries of public sector officials in the Third World. Although this correlation does not 
establish causation, researchers have cited the cases of three countries (Ghana, Peru and 
Uganda) where increased salaries to tax collectors was followed by increased tax revenues 
(Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1998).   
 
Turning to research of the Latin American experience, Saba and Manzetti review the rapid, 
wholesale and corrupt privatisations by Menem in Argentina in the early 1990s. They argue 
from the standpoint that “one of the most troublesome aspects of these corrupt practices is the 
damage they wreak on public support for the market reforms required for economic growth 
and investment” (1997: 355). They advise that “transparency is the best safeguard against 
arbitrary decisions and administrative abuses”, concluding “the association between civilian 
government and corruption is unfortunate wherever it occurs. Again, there is nothing 
inherently wrong or corrupt with free-market economic policies” (ibid.: 366). The problem is 
not with the policy but in its manner of implementation.       
 
This faith in the efficacy of privatisation so long as it is transparent is contentious. According 
to another researcher corruption has increased across the region since 1980, the very period of 
neo-liberal reforms “during which bureaucrats and politicians disposed of huge portions of 
public property, often with limited transparency” (Weyland, 1998: 108).  Weyland suggests 
the role of the mass media in determining the transparency of the political process has become 
critical. He argues that the demise of traditional parties means that neo-populist leaders have 
increased incentives to corrupt practices, they have to raise the funds to pay for sympathetic 
media exposure. Instead of being a factor for transparency and hence tending to reduce 
corruption as per the Klitgaard thesis, the role of the corporate media has been questionable. 
On the one hand there has been greater exposure of corruption scandals, but the media has 
been gaining considerable income from corrupt political leaders. There is evidence of 
corporate media deals with politicians in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Uruguay where 
discounts reached 95 percent (Casas-Zamora, 2004: 49-50). 
 
It seems transparency, as with every element in the equation corruption = monopoly + 
discretion – transparency (C=M+D-T), cannot be read at face value without substantive 
analysis of the exercise of the power relations involved.  Moreno argues that in Argentina and 
other developing countries there is a different problem to resolve:  
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“How can citizens control the corruption of high officials? …One of the keys to 
controlling and preventing corruption is to detect the influence of the political system. 
In a regime of hegemonic power (HP) there are no independent powers but a 
monopoly power (M); the law is not carried out except with the discretion of those 
who hold authority (D) and freedom of the press and information are restricted, thus 
affecting transparency (T).”3 (cited in Ariza Ruiz, 2001: 519) 
 
Hence we have HP=M+D-T, from which Moreno deduces that corruption is none other than 
hegemonic power.   We have seen that Dieterich views corruption functioning as an informal 
system that extends the formal, legal system of class power. That is, corruption serves as an 
additional access to privilege in an already polarised class society. Its informality as a system 
is the product of a contradiction between formal democracy and real class antagonism.  The 
strong implication here, that is lost entirely in the rent-seeking paradigm, is that to challenge 
corruption is also to challenge one of the means by which the dominant class exercises its 
power. This is demonstrated by the case study and is, I will argue, the kernel of an alternative 
theory. 
 
Theorisation of Corruption in Colombia 
 
While corruption in Colombia has certain unusual aspects, that very fact has brought forth a 
literature that deserves wider consideration for a theory of corruption.   
 
The first factor to consider is the connection between the drugs economy and corruption.  
Once it took hold as part of a vicious spiral, the violent narcotics industry has been one of the 
major factors feeding the high level of corruption in Colombia. Drugs money buys a lot of 
local government favours, induces police indifference, blinds the eyes of bureaucrats, colours 
judges’ wisdom and primes presidential election campaigns - see (Thoumi, 1994). 
 
The second factor has been the lack of an effective institutional political opposition whose 
absence generates a pact of silence providing fertile grounds for corruption (Ulloa, 1997: xiv), 
or to put it another way, political exclusion prevents transparency. Colombia’s form of 
‘hegemonic power’ is deeply affected by the geographic limits of the state, its lack of control 
                                                 
3 “¿Cómo hacen los cuidadanos para controlar la corrupción de los altos funcionarios? … Una 
de las claves para controlar y prevenir la corrupción es detectar la influencia del sistema 
político. En un régimen de poder hegemónico (PH) no hay poderes independientes sino un 
poder monopólico (M); no se cumple la ley sino la discrecionalidad de los que detentan la 
autoridad (D) y se retringe la libertad de prensa y la información afectando la transparencia 
(T)”   
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over parts of the national territory reinforcing its oppressive character in those parts it does 
control, where it is experienced as an “hegemonic, autistic and exclusive power”4 (Ariza, 
2001: 519).  This leads on to el clientelismo, clientelism - the informal and illegal yet widely 
practised subversion of the formal election system by politicians retaining loyalty through 
deal-making and vote buying, of which Colombia is a prime example (ibid.: 521-522). These 
procedures have been legitimised over decades of what is called a stable democracy, with 
profound consequences for human rights.  
 
The third factor closely related to corruption is impunity, so much so that Arila depicts them 
as Siamese twins. There is 97 percent conviction failure rate of crimes committed in 
Colombia. The concept of impunity includes not only failure to punish, but use of the law to 
protect special interests. The combined problems of corruption and impunity, or ‘unjust 
justice’, present a determinant, strategic element amongst all of Colombia’s social problems, 
according to a major review: 
 
“When justice does not function, someone usurps its functions, in the majority of 
cases, to exercise them for private benefit. Due to the incapacity of the judicial 
apparatus, offences become profitable and the rates of criminality rise…  If the state, 
through the branches of public power, provides the bases for imparting justice, that is 
to say it legislates, executes and applies justice – what happens when the state is 
corrupt?”5 (Amaya, 2001: 25-26) 
 
There is an outline emerging of a corrupted state’s relationship with society that does not 
quite fit any of the cases depicted by Rose-Ackerman. In part, there has been evidence of a 
Mafia-dominated state. In part Colombia behaves as a kleptocracy, as we shall see 
specifically at local level, meanwhile in many respects and increasingly it conforms to the 
‘bilateral monopoly’ situation in its relations with multinational capital. All of these forms 
involve state capture and corrupt practices harmful to the common good. It is as though there 
has been a succession of parties queuing up to take advantage of the Colombian state and use 
it as an instrument of plunder.  
 
                                                 
4 “un poder hegemónico, autista y excluyente”. 
5 “Cuando la justicia no funciona, alguien usurpa sus funciones, en la mayoría de los casos, 
para ejercerla en beneficio privado. Debido a la incapacidad del aparato de justicia, el delito 
se torna rentable y crecen losíndices de criminalidad…Si el Estado, a través de las ramas del 
poder público, provee las bases para que se imparta justicia, es decir, legisla, ejecuta y aplica, 
¿qué sucede cuando es corrupto?” 
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Rose-Ackerman brings out an issue that is not elaborated theoretically in the rent-seeker 
framework, the distinction between political monopoly and economic monopoly.  This is a 
real point of focus in the Colombian case.  In one view “political capitalism” predominates 
over Colombia’s economic regime, that is a form of capitalism where profits are obtained 
from state privileges and not through competition in the market. A variant of this is that there 
is such a proliferation of ‘rent-seeking’ entrepreneurs and other citizens that Colombia forms 
a “sociedad rentista”, which can be translated as either financier society or rentier society 
(Carvajal and Carvajal, 2002: 517-518).  
 
  
Corruption and Privatisation in Colombia 
Corruption Surveys 
 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 ranks Colombia 59th out of 
133 countries (Lamsdorf, 2004: 284). A joint World Bank / Colombia government survey 
found that over 50 percent of state contracts contain a bribe element, averaging 19 percent of 
their value, and that 11 percent of all state resources are diverted from their official 
destination (Vicepresidencia de la República, 2002: 4). The report found widespread 
administrative corruption, which it saw as regressive, with 14 percent of the income of the 
poor going to paying bribes (ibid.: 26).  Perhaps surprisingly, the survey diagnosed capture of 
the state by private interests as “the most extensive and relevant form of corruption in 
Colombia”.6 The most corrupt of all entities is the National Congress. Private interests 
working from within the highest levels of the state sector affects the formulation of policy, 
but also the politicisation of appointments in the public administration is seen as having a 
strong correlation with corruption (ibid.: 5).  
 
The survey reports low credibility for the state’s fight against corruption, with a view that 
citizens watchdog bodies are needed to augment the state’s own control institutions (ibid.: 52-
55).  Finally, it recommends political reform as the extent of corruption effects the very 
legitimacy of the state, adding a deep note of concern that confronting the issue of governance 
“poses the most difficult challenges”7 (ibid.: 56). 
 
The Privatisation of Utilities in Colombia 
 
                                                 
6 “aparece como la forma de corrupción más extendida y relevante en Colombia”. 
7 “se plantean los desafíos más difíciles”.  
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The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) considers Colombia to be an excellent example 
of the issues involved in the reform of the water and sewerage sector. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century most utilities in Colombian cities were privately owned. In a process riven 
with conflict, from the 1920s onwards these were taken into local state ownership, and then in 
the 1950s the government purchased most of the remaining services given, “the precarious 
conditions in which the services were provided and the lack of investment” (Avendaño and 
Basañes, 1999: 219).   
 
For these IDB authors, the reason that private capital had not invested and kept services in 
adequate condition is not the inherent limits of profitability, but “the limited institutional 
framework” of the time.  Thus the interest in Colombia’s institutional reforms, would they 
provide the regulatory conditions for private provision of public utility services?     
  
The 1991 Constitution had encouraged private participation, but had not established a 
regulatory framework. This was enacted through the residential Public Utilities Law (Law 
142) of 1994 that abolished the government monopoly in public service provision. Law 142 
created the new category of public utility enterprise that would provide residential public 
services under contractual terms. The law established new regulatory bodies to set prices, 
including subsidies for low-income groups. In effect Law 142 established the outputs that had 
to be achieved. State corporations would operate under commercial pressure, if they could not 
perform to meet the service delivery criteria, they would be privatised (Interview with Union 
Adviser).  
 
According to Avendaño and Basañes (1999: 222), the public sector utilities had up to the 
1980s been controlled by the local political class, and were inefficient and inadequate. They 
cite five cases of urban centres in northern Colombia where provision was part-privatised in 
the early 1990s. By 1997 the water delivery system coverage varied between 56 percent and 
94 percent, while the sewerage system coverage was from only 23 percent to 68 percent of the 
relevant populations. The first form of private participation was under management contracts, 
considered to be an unsatisfactory ‘half way house’ (ibid.: 242). The period 1990-1997 saw a 
push for not just private sector management, but full control and effective ownership of the 
utility infrastructure. Avendaño and Basañes main concern is that government discretion to 
vary the terms that private capital invests in the sector should be severely limited, i.e. once 
private capital calculates that a profitable long-term investment can be made, it is allowed to 
realise that investment.   One can see how the pro-privatisation argument draws sustenance 
from the common points it shares with the literature on corruption, particularly the Klitgaard 
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thesis that monopoly needs to be broken and that rules limiting discretion are essential. The 
neo-liberal project in Colombia was being prepared to enter a new phase. 
 
The Issues at Stake – Research Questions 
 
The dominant literature assumes privatisation. The question asked is how state assets and 
public services can be privatised without inflaming corruption. The converse is barely asked, 
viz. is it possible to tackle corruption while keeping services public?   The original 
assumption of agency, that anti-corruption policies will come from the state principal, e.g. 
through a government-led reform programme, has been challenged. Contributors increasingly 
look to outside agents to improve governance - the international institutions, augmented by a 
degree of citizen participation. It is not clear where this process leads and what its limits are 
in terms of national sovereignty. Should there be an ‘anti-corruption’ model taking such 
additional variables into account?  
 
But none of the literature considers the possibility that state sector workers are an actor. In 
terms of the economic theory they are viewed as another privileged interest group, rent-
seekers. What does it mean for the model when a rent-seeker takes action against corruption? 
The World Bank’s social capital thesis makes arbitrary distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
social capitals. While a corrupt network may be normatively explained in terms of ‘bad social 
capital’, to extrapolate this to label groups working against privatisation becomes blatantly 
apologetic. Can the social capital thesis be reinterpreted to explain the forces operating in an 
anti-privatisation struggle?  
 
SINTRAEMCALI’s Fight against Privatisation 
EMCALI Corporation 
Cali is a city of 2.2 million people in the south west of Colombia, lying on the Cauca river 
that runs northwards to its eventual outlet several hundred kilometres downstream in the 
Caribbean. The Cauca valley is traditionally the site of sugar cane plantations, and Cali 
retains a strong Caribbean flavour in its vibrant culture. The poor barrios of the ladera cluster 
on the Andean mountainsides flanking the west of the city, and on its eastern side lies Agua 
Blanca – a city within the city of some 600,000 poor. Most of the housing in these areas was 
built with their own hands by displaced people. 
 
EMCALI Municipal Corporation of Cali supplies electricity, water, telecommunications to 
Cali and the surrounding areas. The corporation was formed in 1931 and has 1.6 million 
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customers using one or more of its services, generating an annual income of 1.2 billion pesos, 
around US $480 million.8  Colombia's urban neighbourhoods are officially graded in six 
social strata according to the quality of housing, ranging from level 1 (very poor) to level 6 
(the rich). There are also ‘level zero’ zones (new arrivals, the invasiones with hand built 
dwellings and no facilities) and even a ‘level sub-zero’, which refers to the destitute and 
homeless (Interview with Youth Worker).  This is important for public utility providers like 
EMCALI, because the higher the level, the higher the prices for services  - a progressive 
consequence of the 1991 Constitution. To illustrate this, in March 2002 EMCALI’s domestic 
electricity charges were 77 pesos, 93 pesos and 131 pesos per kilowatt-hour to level 1, 2, and 
3 households respectively (up to a limit of 200 kilowatt-hours a month); 155 pesos to level 4 
and 186 pesos per kilowatt-hour to households in levels 5 and 6 (Diario Occidental, 2002).  
 
EMCALI scores well on indicators such as percentage of the population covered by each 
service, hours of service, costs for the services, quality of service. The profile of 
telecommunications services is 24 percent commercial, 10 percent to social strata 5 and 6, and 
the remainder to social strata 1,2 3 and 4, including public telephones.  This 66 percent the 
union calls ‘telefonía social’ - a social telephone service.  EMCALI claims to provide the best 
quality drinking water in Colombia, and amongst the best in Latin America.  Maintenance 
costs for drainage are high in Cali, representing about 50 percent of the charges.  
 
SINTRAEMCALI – an example of 'social movement unionism' 
 
SINTRAEMCALI, Sindicato de Trabajodores de EMCALI, is the trade union that organisers 
EMCALI workers. It has two thousand eight hundred members, with a high level of 
unionisation, over 95 percent in the non-management grades. The union has a developed 
social outlook. Attached to the union’s office is the Instituto SINTRAEMCALI, which 
provides evening classes up to secondary completion for the workers’ children, as well as 
technical training. The union’s team of economic and technical advisers worked on a strategy 
to keep EMCALI in the public sector. Detailed preparation helped the union’s argument 
against privatisation of the services its members provide in the economic and technical 
domains, as well as the socially and ethically. SINTRAEMCALI argues that in EMCALI the 
public has a technological platform that can be used for the social benefit and the economic 
profit of Cali and the region. In 2001 the union expanded its Human Rights Department, 
                                                 
8 In Colombia a billion is a million million. Exchange rate used is a rough average for 2002: 
2,500 pesos to 1 US $.  
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which started to do human rights training courses with the participation of a widening 
regional network of trade unions and social movements. 
 
The union’s strategy for opposing privatisation hinged on the idea of uniting with the 
community, and it has employed a range of tactics to further this, including voluntary work 
brigades, community surveys, and outreach education programmes. SINTRAEMCALI’s own 
members are accustomed to mobilisation and use militant direct action tactics. The union has 
built up a network of regional, national and international alliances. In other words the union is 
an advanced example of what is known in the literature as ‘social movement unionism’, 
comparing with similar developments in underdeveloped countries (Novelli, 2003).      
 
The final element in the union’s strategy to defend the public sector, upon which this study 
focuses, is defence through transformation, that is by fighting corruption and, as its struggle 
developed, other forms of economic misdemeanour in the corporation.  
 
History of an Anti-Privatisation Struggle 
The question of EMCALI’s privatisation had been on the agenda from the mid-1990s. Cali’s 
council decided in 1996 that it was going to restructure EMCALI’s three main functional 
areas - water, electricity and telecommunications -into three independent entities. 
SINTRAEMCALI interpreted this as a prelude to privatisation, as each separate unit would be 
more saleable to multinationals specialising in that sector. The union had already developed a 
direct action culture; its members were involved in a series of occupations from 1994 
onwards. The union built up its campaign and in September 1998 it occupied production 
plants and the main administrative building demanding reintegration under one corporation, 
which after days of negotiations it won (Interview with Union Adviser). 
 
Maintaining EMCALI as a multi-service provider remained an issue between the two sides. 
Up until 1999 Cali’s city street lighting had been free, but the Mayor introduced charges and 
handed over the service to a private company. The union held a nine-day strike and conducted 
city-wide demonstrations, attracting fifteen to twenty thousand participants on its marches.  In 
February 2000 a council sub-committee voted 4 to 3 against the Mayor’s proposal to privatise 
EMCALI. But the argument did not end there. The city was polarised into two camps. The 
Mayor and his supporters argued that EMCALI could only go forward with private 
investment. The union and its supporters argued that for EMCALI to be viable its onerous and 
corruptly engaged debts had to be cancelled or otherwise alleviated. Just over 29 percent of 
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the corporation’s income went on debt payments in 2002, the union projected this would rise 
to 39 percent for 2003 (SINTRAEMCALI, 2003b: 23).  
 
In April 2000 Cali’s Mayor took EMCALI corporation out the hands of his own locally 
appointed management board and placed it under the direct control of the national 
Superintendent of Public Domestic Services (SSPD). The SSPD national director announced 
that there would be no more state funding for EMCALI (El Pais, 2000b).  The union argued 
that these measures illustrated a policy of weakening EMCALI, preparing to terminate its 
protected status under Law 142 as a state enterprise, as designated by the corporation’s full 
title EMCALI EICE  (State Industrial and Commercial Corporation). The superintendent’s 
advisory team reported in September 2000, recommending that the telecommunications arm 
should be sold off, and the remaining services (electricity, water and sewerage) be run as a 
concession. By February 2001the union’s telecommunications workers were in dispute, trying 
to block the selling off of the public telephone system to the private company that employed 
security guards to take away the money, but with no trained engineering staff (El Espectador, 
2000).   
 
In the meantime SINTRAEMCALI had launched an anti-corruption offensive against the 
former management board and their allies in senior management posts in the corporation. 
Based on evidence presented to a public hearing, on 12 June 2000 the Prosecutor General 
punished nine officials and opened corruption investigations against another 24 individuals, 
including former members of the management board, two former directors, managers and the 
ex-Mayor. A sum of 26 thousand million pesos (over US $10 million) was involved. The 
punishments varied from 5 days loss of wages to 60 days suspension from work – there were 
no custodial sentences (Procuradaría General de la Nación, 2000; El Pais, 2000a; Revista 
Valle 2.000, 2002). But there was an immediate backlash against the union. Its president, 
Alexander Lopez, was forced into temporary exile after a failed assassination on 14 June - the 
third attempt on his life (Diario Occidente, 2000). “They want to kill me because I defend 
public services”, he later said (Higginbottom, 2000). 
 
This was in the year following President Pastrana’s agreement with the IMF, and besides the 
government was under pressure to find more disposable assets to help finance Plan Colombia. 
There was a strong push to carry through more privatisations.  In October 2000 the 
government sold off Carbocol, Colombia’s coal corporation, for US $ 383 million. Then 
Pastrana announced that EMCALI was definitely going to be privatised. Lopez addressed a 
meeting of union members via international video link, they decided to take strike action 
against the privatisation threat at a time to be decided (ibid.). 
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 Another possibility emerged. Some officials at different levels of the public service opposed 
the government’s privatisation policy. Cali’s Personer’a (local government ombudsman) 
complained that privatisation of street lighting had caused a deterioration in the service and 
demanded its reinstatement to EMCALI. Minister of Labour Angelino Garzon, a dissident 
voice in Pastrana’s Conservative government, appointed an investigating commission that 
recommended, on a majority verdict, against privatisation. Most telling of all, the nation’s 
Controller General publicly rebuked the SSPD for the manner of its intervention in EMCALI, 
which had not been devoted to the corporation’s recovery, but had “sharpened the crisis, and 
will increase pressure for liquidation and privatisation” (El Espectador, 2000).  
 
The second official appointed by the SSPD as Director of EMCALI turned out to be strongly 
in favour of keeping the corporation in the state sector, and was sympathetic to 
SINTRAEMCALI’s aims. In mid-2001, with Lopez back in Colombia and with the old guard 
swept away, the replacement acting Director was able to appoint his preferred senior 
managers, who began working in close cooperation with SINTRAEMCALI and the 
workforce in an emergency programme to recover the corporation and save it from 
privatisation. Their PARE  (literally STOP) programme was run by an internal coalition of 
progressive managers and the union. A series of initiatives had brought the corporation under 
near workers control. From July 2001 the workforce and management worked together 
feverishly to demonstrate practically that their corporation was viable on an ongoing basis, 
provided that it did not have to continue paying off the onerous debts incurred by the previous 
corrupt administration. They estimated that they would only have until the end of the year to 
achieve this objective (Interview EMCALI Managers).  
 
The PARE programme was not allowed that long. The Pastrana government announced that it 
was going to replace EMCALI’s Managing Director with an executive from the Spanish 
multinational FENOSA. The union called a general meeting of all its members. The workers 
decided that if the government tried to implement its decision they would take direct control 
of the corporation (Interview Alexander Lopez I). Pastrana backed off, but it was no more 
than a reprieve.  
 
On 24 December 2001 the union learnt that the SSPD was going to appoint a replacement 
Director of EMCALI, a man with previous experience in the corporation, and who had also 
been charged with corruption. The union assessed that this signalled a decision to press ahead 
and privatise, and it responded by occupying EMCALI’s main administrative building, the 
CAM tower on 25 December. Cali’s working class communities mobilised support 
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demonstrations and food, and other trade unions surrounded the CAM tower to prevent its 
repossession by force. A month on, and with matters apparently at stalemate, a team of 
volunteers from SINTRAEMCALI and social movement activists took over the SSPD 
headquarters in Bogotá on 28 January 2002. It was an audacious move. The situation was 
immediately very tense as anti-riot police and snipers trained their sights on the occupiers in 
the SSPD building. The support alliance, especially at this point international protests, was 
energetic enough to hold off a massacre. The next day the Pastrana government backed down 
and offered a deal guaranteeing no privatisation, no price increases and agreeing to set up an 
anti-corruption commission.9 The union, the community and their growing international 
network were jubilant. A popular mobilisation to defend public services had struck a victory 
against neo-liberalism (Novelli 2003; Interview with Alexander Lopez II). 
 
Lopez stood as a candidate for the Social and Political Front and was elected to Congress for 
the department of Valle del Cauca in March 2002. Uribe came into the presidency in August 
that year. Despite the 29 January 2002 Agreement, Uribe made clear that the future of 
EMCALI was to be re-opened. He denied the advances achieved by the PARE programme, 
stopped the process of worker and community participation and pointedly consulted only with 
the Chamber of Commerce and private business interests. The nub of Uribe’s proposal Todos 
Ponen 10 was to set up a 'Social Capitalisation Fund' that would hand overseeing powers to a 
board of the corporation’s creditors. The Fund was almost a debt for equity swap, except 
without the swap, giving control over the corporation in proportion to debt held. As a cover, 
EMCALI’s users could also buy their way into the Fund, but only by paying a supplement on 
their tariff to pay for their shares, up to 2 percent of the total and which in any case would 
have secondary voting status.  
 
The Social Capitalisation Fund would rationalise all debts, and thus would act as EMCALI’s 
sole creditor. In the words of the Superintendent’s proposal, the Fund: 
 
“will have intervention rights in the administration of the corporation, through 
conditions and agreements. To be included in privileged debt contracts between 
EMCALI and the Fund are: investment decisions, debt and operations contracts for 
the business units.”11 (SSPD, 2003: 12)   
                                                 
9 Full title ‘Agreement of National Government, Municipal Government, SINTRAEMCALI 
and Community representatives for the Saving and Strengthening of EMCALI EICE ESP’. 
10 ‘Everyone Lends a Hand’ 
11 “El Fondo será el único acreedor de Emcali y tendrá ingerencia en la administración de la 
empresa, a través de las condiciones y pactos que se incluyan en los contratos de deuda 
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 The arrangement gives the creditors powers close to full ownership. EMCALI’s service 
infrastructure remains formally in the public sector, but it is directly accountable to finance.    
 
Uribe demanded the union renounce rights that it had negotiated in its Collective Agreement. 
SINTRAEMCALI agreed to forfeit some rights, but insisted on an 'integral solution' which 
renegotiated or otherwise alleviated the corporation’s debts, especially to creditors on the 
Termocali and PTAR contracts which the union argued had been corruptly entered (see 
below). Negotiations began in early 2003 in an atmosphere of brinkmanship. Uribe became 
personally involved. There was a televised confrontation between him and 
SINTRAEMCALI’s new president Lucho Hernández, when Hernández pointed out that the 
President of the Republic had lied. Uribe demanded an apology, but Hernández stuck to his 
version, which was confirmed in the press as true (El Pais, 2003b; El Tiempo, 2003b). 
 
Public complaints forced the suspension for 90 days pending judicial action of another SSPD 
appointed Managing Director of EMCALI, due to “presumed irregularities in the processing 
of contracts” (El Tiempo, 2003a). This incident suggests that the union and community 
alliance is sufficiently strong to achieve some transparency and influence events. The Todos 
Ponen accord was implemented on 5 May 2004, but it has not done away with fundamental 
antagonism between the state and SINTRAEMCALI. On the day that the deal was signed, 
street fighting between riot police and EMCALI workers flared up once again 
(SINTRAEMCALI, 2004).  
 
Comparison to other struggles against privatisation 
The water war in Cochabamba Bolivia took place after the service was privatised, and in 
response to the subsequent tripling of prices. The opposition alliance included a wide range of 
people as consumers, and small peasant water producers whose livelihoods were threatened, 
but was not initiated by unionised workers in the industry (ODG, 2005). Similarly, the 
eruption of protest against privatisations in Argentina was post the event, and based in the 
consumer community (Green, 2003).  
 
In Colombia the privatisation of public services has been on a piecemeal, regionalised basis. 
By 2000, some 60 percent of services were privatised. Again, popular opposition came in 
                                                                                                                                            
privilegiada que subscriban Emcali y el Fondo: decisiones de inversión, endeudamiento y 
contratos de operación de los negocios.”    
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response to loss of jobs and price increases (Pulido, 2003). These circumstances meant that 
workers and citizens in Colombia’s three main cities, Bogotá, Cali and Medellín could look to 
the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean north of their own country to see the likely 
consequences of privatisation, and prepare accordingly.  
 
SINTRAEMCALI’s fight against privatisation has distinct characteristics. It was launched to 
prevent anticipated consequences. The union was in a central position in the anti-privatisation 
alliance with the community. The early alert provided an opportunity to block privatisation, 
whilst challenging corruption from inside the corporation even before a sell off took place. 
This atypicality provided laboratory like conditions to expose corrupt practices that are more 
normally kept hidden.   
 
Economic Offences and Union Counter-strategies 
 
‘Politiquería’ and Indebtedness  
 
Colombians refer to politiquería, a syndrome of corrupt politics where the political class 
feeds itself with the spoils of office. Politiquería combines both political corruption and 
administrative corruption as customarily defined. The two party factions within the dominant 
class milked the region’s biggest corporation, in Cali politiquería functioned as a local 
kleptocracy.  
 
Under Liberal Party control between 1995 and 1997 EMCALI’s board of directors routinely 
helped themselves to 15 percent commissions on contracts (Edwards, 2003: 37). Of greater 
long-term cost, in just three years EMCALI’s debt rose threefold without any evident increase 
in its plant or facilities. The Liberal Mayor Mauricio Guzman was at the centre of using 
EMCALI to extract finance. The funds for phantom projects were navigated through 
EMCALI, although they have nothing to do with its functions.  A notorious case concerns 
Cali’s bridges, construction projects used to skim off so much money that the local joke is 
“we caleños have the most expensive bridges in the world”12 (Interview EMCALI Managers). 
Although Guzman was later imprisoned as a result of the Proceso 8.000 investigation into the 
Cali drugs cartel funding of President Samper’s election campaign in 1994, what is 
                                                 
12 “los caleños somos una población toda vez que tenemos los puentes mas costosos de todo el 
mundo, se necesita mucha imaginación y creatividad para hacer puentes intransitables a ese 
costo”  
 21
remarkable is the lack of control from national or international watchdogs as the debts shot 
up. 
 
The Conservative Mayor Ricardo Cobo who took over in 1998 had two advantages. He had 
married into the Lloreda family, the local grandees with money from sugar, owners of the 
regional daily newspaper El Pais and much else besides. A Conservative had won the 
presidency, Andres Pastrana, whose Minister of Education was also a Lloreda. Pastrana 
presided over a torrent of corruption, as later press reports revealed. With these protections in 
place, “pilferage turned to plunder” (Edwards, 2003: 38).  
 
But even this was not the end of it, for the illegal corruption had incurred a legally 
enforceable indebtedness - that grew and grew, until it came to take over EMCALI 
completely.   
    
Enter the Multinationals 
 
Termoemcali 
  
Termoemcali was formed on 22 December 1994. The principal shareholders were JMC Cauca 
Valley Inc - a US company formerly known as Boston Energy, with a 93 percent stake - and 
EMCALI, that had 7 percent of the shares. Termoemcali was set up to operate a 220 Mwatt 
thermoelectric generating plant.  The main contract was linked in to a Protected Price 
Agreement (PPA) signed on 8 May 1995 that stated that EMCALI would buy electricity at 
US 4 cents per kilowatt-hour.  Another company, Intergen Management Services Ltd 
Colombia (a subsidiary of the US corporation Bechtel) was commissioned to build and 
operate the plant, which came on line in July 1999, at a total cost of US $215 million. 
EMCALI financed the original estimate of  $165 million by floating bonds in the US, and was 
obliged to procure additional loans to meet the $50 million cost overrun. The Controller 
General pointed out that at an installation cost of $919 per kilowatt this generator capacity 
was “excessively costly” compared to other generators. But worse was to come, wholesale 
market prices for electricity were significantly lower than the minimum agreed prices in the 
PPA. For example, in May 2000 the PPA price for Termoemcali’s electricity was 111 pesos 
per kilowatt-hour, while the open market price was just 40 pesos per kilowatt-hour. EMCALI 
would have to pay about US $9,400 extra daily for taking Termoemcali’s output. Under the 
terms of the PPA, EMCALI has in any case to continue paying US $4.5 million Termoemcali 
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a month whether or not it is buying any output (EMCALI, 1994; Termoemcali, 1994; 
Controlería 2000: 12; Diario Occidente 2003).  
 
For the private investor, a PPA eliminates risk and ensures a continuing guaranteed return on 
the investment. But for the municipal corporation Termoemcali had become an expensive 
white elephant, a plant that generated no electricity or income, only costs. Why had such a 
one-sided contract ever been signed in the first place? A strong clue lies in the circumstance 
that ownership of Termoemcali had passed to a new consortium that was made up EMCALI 
(43 percent), Intergen (54 percent) and Corporación Financiera del Pacífico (3 percent) – 
headquartered in the Cayman Islands. Edwards (2003: 38) notes this last company 
disappeared in 2000 with all of its principals censured and fined for financial irregularities. 
The perpetrators of the deal seem to have evaporated, while Bechtel is left collecting the 
money every month. Not surprisingly, SINTRAEMCALI and many others demand that the 
PPA be cancelled as an unfair contract (Hernández, 2003). 
PTAR 
 
The Planta de Tratamiento de Aguas Residuales (PTAR) sewerage treatment plant at 
Cañaveralejo is a high technology automated operation, using methane gas taken off in early 
stages to power the final processing (Interview EMCALI Managers). The plant was built by a 
consortium including the Japanese corporations Mitsubishi Suido and Tokyo Engineering, 
plus Norberto Odebrechi (Brazil) and Degremont (France), financed with a loan to EMCALI 
from the Japanese government backed development bank JBIC. The initial loan of US $75 
million spiraled up to a final US $165 million (Edwards, 2003: 38; El Pais, 2003c).  
 
Late in 2000 Cali's Municipal Controller initiated an action without precedent in the city's 
history and froze the personal assets of 53 citizens under investigation for their role in the 
PTAR contract.  The enquiry went back to 1991 – 1995, and monies paid out for advice and 
inventory management during the design stage of the PTAR project. Corrupt practices 
included overcharging for site clearance, and multiple consultancies invoicing for the same 
design study (Interview Union Adviser; Edwards, 2003: 38,47). 
 
Despite its high cost, PTAR will only process 40 percent of Cali’s waste water output.  The 
union argued that since most of the benefit from the plant will be for the four departments 
downstream, the government should honour a commitment to that 80 percent of the 
construction cost comes from national funds (SINTRAEMCALI, 2001a). For its part, the 
government insists that PTAR’s running costs of $10 million a year be covered by increases 
in water charges to the caleños of 15 percent to 35 percent. 
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 Unregistered Use – Tapping of Electricity and Consumer non-
payment of bills 
 
At the other end of the scale of economic offences, it is not unusual in the very poorest areas 
for whole blocks to hook up to the electric mains and tap off supplies. This is a dangerous 
practice; fires occur and can quickly destroy dwellings. This is truly a collective form of law 
breaking by those living on the margins, beyond the limits of regulation. The other forms of 
illegal electricity consumption are individual. Either by-passing the seal on the electricity 
meter or not paying the bills.   
 
These types of ‘offences’ evoke a mixed and even contradictory response from EMCALI and 
its workers. As an economic entity EMCALI needs to maximise income from its customers. 
Socially, most of its workforce and SINTRAEMCALI as a union are sympathetic to the 
sections of desplazados who simply cannot afford to pay. The union developed a differential 
response to these problems. As part of its strategy of working with the community, 
SINTRAEMCALI started doing voluntary work brigades, or community mingas.13 These 
were weekend events, where once a month SINTRAEMCALI members and other workers 
provided free services to a selected neighbourhood. While work teams were fixing drains and 
wiring, SINTRAEMCALI also sent out other teams to carry out a detailed census of all 
electricity use in the zone, checking on meters and any signs of illegal consumption. This had 
been approved in advance with local community leaders, but nonetheless the census teams 
were anxious in case they met opposition.14   
 
The leaflet distributed by SINTRAEMCALI to the community literally reflects the two sides 
of this relationship. One side calls the attention of the local people: 
 
“Take advantage, if you have damages and complaints about water, sewerage, 
electricity, telephones then call … Besides, there will be a day of health, hairdressing, 
cultural activities and lawyers advice. We await you and count on your presence.”15 
(SINTRAEMCALI, 2001b) 
 
                                                 
13 The term minga resonates with associations, it means both work team and a group who 
come together to help someone in the community, e.g. to repair a house.  
14 Meeting Note, 21 February 2001 
15  “Aproveche; si Usted tiene daños y quejas en acueducto, alcantarillado, energía, teléfonos, 
informe a los teléfonos …Además habrá una jornada de salud, peluquería, actividades 
culturales y asesoría de abogados”.   
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And, on the other side,  
 
“Friend User,  
Avoid snags, and future punishment – even imprisonment for one to four years. Take 
advantage of the Community Minga that the EMCALI workers will carry out to be 
connected legally to public services.  Remember that Article 26 of the new Criminal 
Code states that ‘any clandestine mechanism to alter water, electric or 
telecommunications metres or a fraudulent connection will incur prison from one to 
four years and fines from one to a hundred minimum salaries’.   
 
Join with us, the workers of EMCALI EICE are your friends”.16    
 
The union adopted the position that as a human right all homes should receive basic 
electricity whether or not they could afford to pay. It helped blocks that had tapped in illegally 
to make a safe connection through a common metre, while at the same time negotiating with 
the council that subsistence consumption in these zones be paid for out of municipal funds as 
a form of special relief (Interview Community Leaders). 
        
Under the PARE, there was a renewed drive to encourage customers to pay their bills 
promptly appealing to good will order to help defend EMCALI as a public corporation. In the 
electricity branch specialist work-units “to recover non-technical losses” worked 
systematically. The teams targeted businesses and residences of all social strata, keeping 
detailed records of actions taken (EMCALI, 2001).    
Inflated Operating Costs 
 
Operating costs at EMCALI were inflated by a range of different practices that can be 
grouped under the headings of procurement and inefficiencies.   
 
 
Procurement 
                                                 
16 “Amigo Usuario: Evite inconvientes, sanciones en el futuro y hasta prisión de uno a cuatro 
años. Aproveche la MINGA COMUNITARIA que realizarán los trabajadores de EMCALI 
para que se conecte de manera legal en los servicios públicos. Recuerde que el nuevo Código 
de Procedimiento Penal, en su Artículo 256, establece que ‘cualquier mecanismo clandestino 
que altere los CONTADORES de agua, energía y telecomunicaciones o una conexión 
fraudulenta incurrirá en prisión de uno a cuatro años y multas de uno a cien salarios 
mínimos’. Acérquese, los trabajodores de EMCALI E.I.C.E., Somos Sus Amigos.”  
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Procurement is the classic area for corrupt practices.  For years management corruption 
artificially inflated operating costs through over billing and fraudulent sub-contracting. 
 
According to the Prosecutor General, EMCALI had made around 40 contracts on political 
recommendations rather than objective grounds, and large sums of money had been paid to 
unregistered organisations.  Between 1998 and 1999 the directors of EMCALI's 
telecommunications arm spent over US $30,000 on themselves, had signed a series of 
overpriced contracts, and one contract for $210,000 of fictitious services. The electricity 
managers had entered contracts for $3 million without budgetary clearance, while the water 
section managers specialised in sub-contracting out work that could have readily been done 
by the permanent workforce (Procuradaría General de la Nación, 2000). 
 
Under the PARE programme this problem was addressed in two ways. Firstly, managers were 
appointed strictly according to their technical capacity. Technically competent workers 
replaced nearly all of the dismissed corrupt managers. The worker-managers were on the 
same salaries as they previously earned, and were meanwhile expected to take on managerial 
responsibility. This had the side effect of saving on managers' salaries, but the connection 
between managers and workforce working together was far more significant for morale. 
Secondly, great efforts were made to avoid sub-contracting with the target of eliminating it 
completely from operational areas such as cuts, suspensions, reconnections, re-installations, 
fraud detection and the installation of new clients. This process threw up interesting 
contradictions. The workers agreed to avoid unnecessary overtime, and accept flexible 
working, in part so that they could be re-deployed to tasks that might otherwise go to sub-
contractors (Interview EMCALI Managers).  
 
Efficiency gains 
  
While avoidable inefficiencies and waste are not by definition corruption, it might be 
considered there is an overlap at the lower end of corrupt practices, e.g. using corporation 
petrol for private trips or negligence in fuel use.  It would seem likely that in work 
environment where managers are believed to be on the graft, the workforce might feel it 
acceptable to take whatever perks it can. The new union/management team endeavoured to 
change such attitudes through the PARE programme.  The workers cooperated in avoiding 
wasteful practices, fuel consumption for example was cut by 42 percent, and the use of the 
corporation’s mobile phones was reduced to a minimum. Many of the workers involved 
themselves in the minga voluntary work teams visiting communities once a month. There was 
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an ongoing political dialogue lead by the union to change the work culture, to really work for 
the service of the community.  A new ethic was being engendered.  
 
Manipulation of Assets and Liabilities 
 
Non-payment of debts by State Bodies.  
EMCALI has had difficulties in getting state entities that are clients to pay their debts as 
customers. According to one manager, “they are trying to push EMCALI into debt while we 
are trying to save it from being in debt”. (Interview Union Adviser) 
 
Asset Portfolio 
As well as the Termoemcali contracts, the contracts with two other generators Termocauca 
and Termopacifico were on remarkably favourable terms to the suppliers.  SINTRAEMCALI 
further alleges that there have been irregularities in the purchase of top of over-priced shares 
in other businesses and buildings.   
 
 
Padded Retirement Scheme 
EMCALI had set up a pension fund for its employees. There have been three major issues in 
dispute. SINTRAEMCALI negotiated early retirement for workers in hazardous jobs, 15 
years service for sewerage workers, and after 20 years for others. This early retirement 
package has been a permanent point of attack against the union, especially in the Lloreda 
family’s press (El Pais, 2002a; 2003a). 
 
The story has another side.  Crooked managers had used the fund for buying influence, setting 
up false entitlements and retiring their cronies early. The national government has not 
accepted its statutory commitments. The combined effect is that every year EMCALI paid US 
$3 million more into the pension than it should. The new managers approached Minister of 
Labour Garzon and agreed a complete check of the pension portfolio, eliminating those who 
had no right to a pension with the aim of establishing an honestly administered fund 
(Interview EMCALI Managers). 
 
 
Dubious Debts 
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In the years 1992 to 1997 the basic rate of interest varied between 5 and 10percent, and yet 
EMCALI's debts were contracted at interest rates of 20-25percent. There is some indication 
that although cases involving loan debts and contracts with multinationals involve sums larger 
than procurement irregularities by a factor of ten or more, suspected corruption has been 
harder to prove evidentially as in illegal action, although the costs are all the greater. The 
union tends to mix this category of offences in with its general denunciation of aggressors 
against the corporation. It presents external debt payments, internal debt payments and 
payments to major suppliers alongside the payments to Termoemcali as financial aggression 
that is destabilising EMCALI by taking a projected 69 percent of its income. 
SINTRAEMCALI urges renegotiation of EMCALI's debt, which it sees as a culmination of 
disastrous decisions by previous managers combined with government policy 
(SINTRAEMCALI, 2003b: 24).  
 
Anti-corruption as Class Struggle 
 
SINTRAEMCALI has a carefully controlled process of handling allegations of corruption. 
The union set up its own specialist unit – an Anti-Corruption Commission – to investigate and 
document corrupt practices. Complaints from the public or workers are evaluated and 
documentation is collected. Only then are the complaints passed to lawyers for advice. If 
there is merit in the complaint then it is passed to EMCALI to resolve through its own internal 
procedures, or to the competent state authority. The post-1991 Constitution had created three 
national departments with the remit to investigate and control other branches of the state.  
 
Between 1999 and 2001 the union presented evidence concerning cases dating back to 1995. 
The money lost to EMCALI totalled 846 thousand million pesos, about US $338 million 
(SINTRAEMCALI, 2002). If one averages this loss to corrupt practices over a six-year 
period, it amounts on average to about one sixth of the corporation’s operating income. Cali’s 
Contraloría wrote to SINTRAEMCALI in March 2002 confirming that it was processing 82 
cases of corruption referred to it by the union (Contraloría, 2002). The General Prosecutor 
wrote to SINTRAEMCALI in May 2002 confirming that his office was processing 149 
complaints that it had received concerning corruption of the EMCALI managing board, 
managers and officials (Procudaría General, 2002). 
 
The union has a sophisticated and class conscious differentiation in its strategies. It is possible 
to summarise by tabulating, in ascending order, see Table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1: Type of Offence and Union Action 
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 Type of Offence Responsible Union Remedial Action Comment 
Waste Workforce Waste and Efficiency 
targets 
Change of attitude 
Tapping of electricity Poor Communities Joint Area Programmes Requires Co-
operation with City
Poor Communities Locally specific mingas, 
reminder of law -
"Conscientisation" 
Small Businesses, 
Commerce, Residents 
Energetic debt collecting 
Non-payment of bills  
State Bodies  Public Lobbying 
Differentiated 
Response  
False supply invoices Management Board/ 
Local Politicians 
Commission on bids Management Board/ 
Local Politicians 
a) Uncovering of 
evidence 
b) Trigger for 
security 
problem? 
Fictitious or 
unnecessary pensions 
Management Board/ 
Local Politicians 
a) Exposure and active 
denunciation of vested 
interest; 
b)  Pass evidence to state 
control authorities  
Contradictory, 
press hostile 
Unreasonable Loans Multinational 
company and local 
consultants 
 
One sided contracts Multinational 
company and local 
consultants 
a) Exposure and active 
denunciation of vested 
interest; 
b) pressure to renegotiate a la Enron 
 
 
A wide range of economic misdemeanours that affected the viability of the corporation were 
addressed, only some of which could be described as crimes of the powerful.  The union had a 
sophisticated and differentiated set of responses, according to the type of offence and the type 
of offender responsible. The union’s elected leadership was acting a principal agent against 
corruption and white-collar crime. The fight against corruption built up and reached a 
highpoint under the PARE programme, the phase during which the workers were most 
empowered within the corporation. This process was ejecting corrupt practices, and attitudes 
that accepted them, was in its substance a recapture of the state corporation in the public 
interest. It was informed by a broader vision of social justice. These ethical practices gave the 
union, despite a campaign to stigmatise and criminalise it, a claim to the moral high ground 
and it attracted allies and support on that basis. Anti-corruption had been adopted as a front of 
class struggle.  
 
The Criminalisation of Social Protest  
 
Violations Against SINTRAEMCALI 
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“The watchword of the multinationals and their supporters has been that you have to 
liquidate the trade unions, that is to liquidate trade unionists.” (Interview Union 
Adviser)  
 
Many SINTRAEMCALI members have been arrested for participating in occupations, in 
1996 alone 600 were punished, in 1997 300 were punished of whom 22 were imprisoned. 55 
union members have been charged with rebellion. Away from major events and clashes with 
official state forces, the forms of harassment against the union include heavy surveillance of 
its leaders and their families. The principal leaders operate with armed body guards, and 
move home periodically. Constant death threats by telephone and warning cards (in the form 
of invitations to their own funeral) are sent to individuals. Sixteen people, either union 
members, community members connected with the anti-privatisation campaign, or members 
of the immediate families of either of these categories, have been assassinated.  It is not the 
focus of this case study to document this phenomenon, as it effects all Colombia’s social 
movements and was examined in the case study on SINALTRAINAL - although see 
(Hernandez, 2004; Higginbottom 2004) for reports.  What concerns us here is any connection 
between exposure of the corrupt practices, the fight against privatisation and the 
criminalisation of social protest.    
 
Through its anti-corruption campaign the union is condemning its condemners. But in this 
context this is not a technique of neutralisation of the dominant social morality, rather a 
conscious rejection of it.  Two opposite discourses are competing in the public domain, both 
trying to portray their opponents as the criminals. Community groups working with 
SINTRAEMCALI (2001c) put on their leaflets “To privatise EMCALI is to rob the people.”17  
                                                 
17 “Privatizar a EMCALI es Robar al Pueblo” 
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Evaluation of representativity in sector 
 
EMCALI as a corporation provides similar services to those offered by public corporations in 
other major cities. The services in Bogotá are separately supplied, whereas the city of 
Medellín also has a multi-service corporation - Empresa Pública de Medellín (EPM). EPM 
exemplifies a contrasting approach within the public sector to EMCALI. The corporation is 
headquartered in a high-tech computer controlled ‘intelligent’ building, it has expanded 
operationally by aggregating up smaller state suppliers in other regions. EPM is an example 
of high commercialisation, and projects itself much more like a multinational than a 
conventional public sector supplier. One possibility to keep EMCALI in the public sector is to 
merge the two corporations, or form an alliance between them (Interview EMCALI 
Managers).  
 
Similar corrupt practices in the setting up of one-sided electricity supply deals are the cause of 
public scandal in the TermoRio case, and outrageous pension fraud occurs elsewhere as in the 
Folconpuertos scandal (Portafolio, 2003a; El Tiempo, 2004). Other public utilities unions 
have experienced similar repression when they resist privatisation, as with the 
telecommunications workers union SINTRATELEFONOS and the electricity workers union 
SINTRAELECOL (Interview SINTRATELEFONOS Leader; Interview Group of CUT 
Unions and NGOs).  In these respects it is therefore valid to generalise from the 
SINTRAEMCALI case although, as already commented, there are special circumstances in 
the case concerning the union’s advanced capacity in implementing an alliance with the 
community.      
 
Theoretical Observations 
 
State Dualities and Dualities within the State 
 
Santos (2001) analyses the duality of the state and its chameleon like character when dealing 
with “civilised zones” and “savage zones” of Colombia’s acute social apartheid. These 
observations concern the state’s juridical and repressive arms. But here we are discussing a 
branch of the state carrying out social functions. By the nature of its services the utility 
corporation and its workers may enter all zones. The workers providing domestic utilities and 
their relation with the “savage” zones may be much less distant and antagonistic to the local 
community than the police entering those same areas.   In this respect at least, the state is not 
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a unified entity, rather there is differentiation and even conflict within it. The duality within 
the state comes to the fore in this case study. 
 
Turning rent-seeking wisdom on its head 
 
The case study shows that concern to stop corruption need not by definition be subsumed 
under the driver of privatisation. On the contrary, in this example anti-corruption was used as 
a major means to defend state sector provision of public services. Unionised state sector 
workers have been treated as another ‘rent-seeking’ special interest group, seeking to defend 
privilege. But the case study turns this conventional wisdom on its head. The corrupt want to 
privatise as a means of continuing their privileges, while the union encourages vigilance 
against corruption because it robs public funds, and undermines its vision of co-operation 
with the community. 
 
The case study also challenges assumptions about monopoly. What is the character of the 
monopoly that induces corruption? It is not monopoly as a service provider – but the 
monopoly of management control over the service. We have found that corruption as an 
informal system of the local politically dominant class.  The problem is monopoly of political 
power rather institutional monopoly. 
 
The IMF/World Bank ‘rent-seeking’ view of corruption is concerned with removing barriers 
to the penetration of international capital, so that finance may lay hold of the apparatus and 
infrastructure that others had controlled (and milked through corrupt means).  The means for 
this are not public mobilisation against corruption but pressure on the elite. So there is anti-
corruption from above and anti-corruption from below.  But the World Bank needs a domestic 
base to maintain social control and implement its programme; this determines the form and 
sets a limit on the thoroughness of the World Bank's anti-corruption drive. 
 
Can two bads make a good? Beyond the social capital thesis 
 
The necessity to invoke perverse or bad social capital to explain a range of (what the 
ascribing author considers to be) harmful phenomena is the reducto ad absurdum of the entire 
social capital thesis. 
 
SINTRAEMCALI has demonstrated enormous resourcefulness and extensive networking 
capacity, these could be considered illustrative of ‘bonding social capital’ and ‘bridging social 
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capital’ respectively. Its antagonistic attitude to the privatisation project would be considered 
an example of ‘bad’ social capital. At the same time the local elite’s milking of EMCALI 
illustrates another example of informal connections being used to perverse ends. In these 
terms the anti-corruption fight was a clash between two bad social capitals.  This illustrates a 
deep flaw in the social capital thesis, the vacuous and moralistic labeling of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
social capitals.  The designation seems class based or politically determined, and recalls all 
the problematic features of labeling deviancy, with the addition of a spurious patina of 
considered social scientific authority.  
  
Let us turn to consideration of the possibility of social capital being shaped for an 
emancipatory project. The emancipation seems to have been given a non-socialist character in 
advance by Schuurman, who tells the reader (four times) that socialism is dead. One has to 
question whether emancipatory social capital is being suggested as an acceptable alternative 
to unacceptable socialism. A basic problem here is sharing the assumption that social 
attributes have to be capital to be of any worth. Capital is a social power that augments itself, 
feeding on its own investment. This notion can be treated as mere tautology, except that 
closer inspection reveals that capital feeds off the labour of others. The working class, at least 
the one under discussion, does not have any capital, therefore by definition under these terms 
it cannot be of any worth. Social capital is a loaded concept, with built in success for some 
and failure conditions for others - which takes us back to the inevitable asymmetry between 
good and bad social capital. Indeed, there is a confusion of capital with class here. Recalling 
Dieterich’s suggestion that corruption and disappearances occupy a similar space as informal 
systems of privilege, one could likewise consider parallels in the struggles against 
disappearances and corruption. In Latin America and elsewhere it is the victims’ families who 
have led the campaign against disappearances. An historic memory has been consciously 
recovered, with national variations, but also as a continental movement.   Why not a historic 
memory of struggles against corruption, as part of a collective class-consciousness fighting 
privatisation? 
 
Just as poor remakes of old film classics reveal a hidden benefit, at least they can be thanked 
for leading the viewer back to the original, so we can say of the ‘bad social capital’ thesis. 
The acquired social capital needed to participate in corruption is reminiscent of the 
differential association learning of white-collar crime as in Sutherland. And is it not part of 
the class formation of a ‘lumpen-bourgoisie’? If so, then as the forms of dependency evolve 
so will the forms of corruption that need to be learnt as hidden class practices.  
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There is an interesting coincidence in the terminology for the board of creditors in the case 
study, the Social Capitalisation Fund. Here again the working class, whether as producer or 
consumer of public services, is allowed a presence, but one which is subordinate and marginal 
by design. Social Capitalisation is socialised capital, that is capital acting as the public 
decision making power on behalf of society. And not just any capital, but finance – the 
multinational beneficiaries of one-sided contracts, internal and external bankers. The Social 
Capitalisation Fund is a retrospective legitimisation of the previous corruption, if not the 
individuals then its product as an informal system that ended up handing formal control of 
public service to private interests.   
   
If one were to generalise the proposition, it is that social movements are seeking emancipation 
from socialised capital, not with social capital. 
 
Impunity and Active Citizenship – the limits of the principal-agent-
client model 
 
At first sight the case conforms to the principal-agent-client model. We have identified 
conditions of mutual interest in the privatisation project leading to a degree of collusion 
between principal (as in national government) and agent (as in local politiquería).  But there 
is instability in the role of principal, between local elite, national government, national control 
authorities and so on. There are similar issues with the agent and client roles. As agents, the 
senior EMCALI managers were very close indeed to their political masters, who are both 
principals and clients. These are not however objections in principal to the model.     
 
The real objection is the mixing up of this model with identifying the forces against 
corruption. Minimally, a distinction can be drawn between a corruption model and an anti-
corruption model. A recurring theme in the reform literature on corruption is the gap between 
good intentions and deeds. This is seen as an implementation problem. But the issue goes 
deeper, especially in a country like Colombia.  What if the principal, agent and client all 
collude and mutually support each other in a system of impunity?  To end corruption requires 
either the system to breakdown or a challenge from without.  Transparency International’s 
solution to this problem is to promote ‘active citizenship’, and quotes Juan Tokatlian, 
  
“Besides a consistent state policy to fight corruption it also takes strong civic 
involvement, to control, curb and warn against corruption before it takes place. 
Without active citizenship, corruption will be even more widespread.’” (cited in 
Luzzani, 2002: 182)  
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 Active citizenship nonetheless plays a supplementary role, a walk-on part that is not built into 
the model. Whereas in the case study, the main anti-corruption force has been an alliance of 
state sector workers and active citizens.  
The Commodification of rights 
 
In the normative sense, access to domestic utility services is considered a human right. 
Certainly access to the consumption of drinking water. So too is the complement, access to 
drains and sewerage, as becomes obvious on wet Andean mountainsides where poor 
dwellings are permanently endangered by mudslides. We have seen that the Colombian 
Constitution provides for a state of social right and that, as a consequence, the state regulates 
a progressive pricing policy. But even with this formal state protection, the most marginalised 
in society do not have their rights to water respected. A significant proportion cannot afford 
electricity even at subsidised prices.  
 
The situation becomes qualitatively worse once privatisation threatens. The Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) said that EMCALI must be privatised at the very point when honest 
managers of the corporation were pointing out that current income was covering current costs 
(Edwards, 2003: 39). The commodification of rights is both a consequence and cause of 
corruption. 
 
The latent role of the public sector technocracy 
One cannot say that the role of the bureaucracy is ambiguous. For years senior managers in 
EMCALI colluded in corruption, and were in favour of privatisation. And yet there was 
another section or element of public service managers and officials, the technocracy for want 
of a better term, who believe in public service principles and reject corrupt use of public 
funds. One could describe this as a latent force which SINTRAEMCALI’s policy of 
mobilisation helped bring into active play. The senior management of EMCALI who took 
over after the corrupt managers were removed explained their philosophy before introducing 
the plan to save the corporation. They explained that while in the neo-liberal doctrine capital 
and labour are in competition, with capital trying to use labour to create profit, the 
relationship within EMCALI is different. The 'public capital' of EMCALI is used to 
complement the efforts of labour within a common mission to provide public services. The 
directors are opposed to privatisation, because they believe that public capital and labour need 
to be applied together for the benefit of the whole community, not to any particular interests 
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(Interview EMCALI Managers). The union SINTRAEMCALI continues to argue for 
appointment of middle and senior managers in EMCALI by merit (SINTRAEMCALI, 
2003c).  
 
If the bureaucracy has a double role, to implement the official rules and the unofficial 
demands for privilege of the dominant class, only exceptionally will officials break with this 
dual system. These exceptions are all the more important, as they provide a channel of 
information to the real workings of the system. 
 
Contesting the Modernisers’ Corruption Theory 
 
In the case study concerned with privatisation, corruption had saddled EMCALI with a 
crippling debt, but in investigating the inter-relation between corruption and indebtedness we 
need to analyse which is cause and which is effect.   
 
According to the modernisation paradigm corruption is an obstacle to incoming investment 
from the multinationals.  According to the dependency paradigm, the most dangerous aspect 
of corruption is that it lets in the multinationals on advantageous terms, allowing them to take 
over a country and its resources.  What are the roots of corruption according to these 
competing conceptions? For Rose –Ackerman the fundamental motivator is self-interest: 
 
“Critics call it greed. Economists call it utility maximization. Whatever the label, 
societies differ in the way they channel self-interest. Endemic corruption suggest a 
pervasive failure to tap self-interest for productive purposes” (1999: 3). 
  
The best to be hoped for are institutions that can only channel the pre-given self-interest. But 
this approach is reductive and individualistic, and fails to capture the sociological relations of 
class and power that overdetermine any individual predilections. In the case study example 
two social groupings engaged in a fight over the future of the same corporation but acting in 
very different ways, the one avaricious, the other public spirited. This difference cannot be 
reduced down to individuals but concerns the social formation of the groupings.   
 
The basis of a more consciously sociological concept of corruption is given as “a perversion 
of power” (Brasz, 1970 [1963]: 41). Let us fuse this with Dieterich’s analysis, and formulate 
corruption as “an informal system perverting state power to private advantage”. By informal 
we mean indefensible, illegal, secret. But informality in all these respects is contingent. On so 
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many occasions a blind eye is turned and impunity is the norm. Such a definition is not 
specific enough however. On this definition corruption would be no different to, say, 
informally practiced extra-judicial killings or other repressive actions. Corruption refers to the 
powers or capacities of those in the formal bureaucratic apparatus, rather than (e.g.) the 
military.  Corruption is an informal system misusing the state’s executive power or 
bureaucratic apparatus to private economic advantage. 
 
Why are punishments for corruption so light? The easiest explanation is that the perpetrators 
and the judges come for the same class - they are, after all, ‘one of us’, as per Sutherland’s 
wider comment on the attributes of white-collar crime. This seems inadequate. For the sake of 
the legitimacy of the system, corrupt behaviour cannot be legally sanctioned in a democracy, 
and yet the possibility of such behaviour needs to be kept around, on standby for such times 
as may be useful. Hence punishment is meant to neither deter the practice, nor to rehabilitate 
the offender. Rather it is an inducement to potential corrupt actors to learn better how to avoid 
being caught.  
 
Consider this discussion in relation to the overall thesis attempting to construct a theory of 
crimes of the powerful in the dependency paradigm.  Corruption’s place and definition in the 
modernisation paradigm, has itself evolved. Since (Kreuger, 1974) rent-seeking theory is the 
basis of the economistic neo-liberal theory of corruption. Corruption as part of import-
substituting state needs to be swept aside as a barrier to trade and investment. In the late 
1990s social capital was taken up as part of the post-Washington consensus to get the 
institutions right, neo-liberalism in a velvet glove.  Once multinational capital moves in and 
takes a hold, another face is appearing. Moving in the early years of the twenty first century to 
the neo-conservative phase, which is ever more frank about the use of state power, we can 
expect both the tolerance of corruption and its theoretical contours to shift towards a more 
permissive stance.  
 
What would be the constituents a theory of corruption in the dependency paradigm? First of 
all that corruption is not simply an inherited attribute of traditional society, but is related to 
contemporaneously acting forces of underdevelopment; secondly corruption is an expression 
of dependency; and thirdly that it is in some way functional to capital reproduction, and to 
social control of the subordinate classes.  
 
To satisfy these requirements one would expect corruption to change its form in relation to 
the form of underdevelopment. This is illustrated in Colombia’s case, where the hybrid 
manifestations of corruption express the country’s hybrid forms of underdevelopment (part 
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latifundista, part semi-industrialised and both coming under the domination of finance 
capital).  Corruption as a product of underdevelopment can accept deficit causation - e.g. the 
relative poverty of public officials for administrative corruption, state services less than 
demand (Ulloa, 1997: 85) -and especially sees inequality as a stimulus to corruption.   
 
As regards dependency, the local ruling class will only get away with corruption in so far as 
this is subservient, acceptable to and serves (or at least is not against) the interests of 
multinational capital.   Corrupt practices do not only occur in Third World, dependent nations. 
As Ruggiero (2000) points out in his comparative study of three Western European states - 
Italy, France and the UK - each country finds its own nationally characteristic forms of 
corruption. Nor can it be assumed that all forms of corruption are the same in all Third World 
countries without, again, considering the national specifics. There is, nonetheless, an 
important path to explore. To what extent are the corrupt practices revealed in this case study 
common to Third World countries, and in some way constitutive of their dependent 
condition?  In this regard it is worth highlighting two elements in the case study that are 
generalised.  
 
The nefarious Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) can be found operating on private supply 
projects in at least eleven Third World countries, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The 
multinationals involved come from rich First World countries (US, France, Norway, United 
Kingdom, Japan, Germany and Switzerland) whose states in many cases sponsor the projects 
through export guarantee funding (Bosshard, 2002). Perhaps the most notorious case is 
Enron’s Dabhol power plant in Maharashtra, India, which threatened to send the state 
government into bankruptcy (ibid.: 13; Prashad, 2002: 100-105). Bosshard comments that the 
common features of PPAs include lack of competitive bidding, lack of rational planning, 
cronyism and corruption, the risk of insufficient demand, high exchange rate risks, high cost 
of private power and cronyism and corruption (2002: 9). 
 
The PPA practice is so widespread that there must have been some process whereby power 
supply multinationals within the pro-privatisation business community learnt how to set up 
such one sided deals. A corruption inducing commercial practice has been diffused 
internationally, independent of national characteristics. One could call this the globalisation of 
white-collar crime, except with the proviso, as we have noted, that the principal beneficiaries 
are (First World) multinationals, whereas the victims are the public in Third World countries, 
and the agents are those officials induced to agree the PPAs. Here we have a strong example 
of the functionality of corruption for economic profitability, and hence the clear rationale to 
the private corporation of pursuing such a policy, despite harmful consequences to the public.   
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 Is there a further demand side aspect to this beyond the corruption of decision making 
officials? It is almost more shocking to consider that the officials could have signed without 
any corrupt exchange taking place. It may well be that the original attraction of a private 
international supplier is connected with the technological prowess of the corporation. Lack of 
industrial technical capacity (apparent or real) weakens the local state authority in its 
negotiations. In other words there is a suggestion of a relationship between technical 
incapacity and proneness to corruption that would require further research to explore. 
Nonetheless, this aspect of the case study, reinforced by evidence from similar international 
experiences, prompts a serious reflection on the ‘lumpenbourgeoisie’ thesis. The thesis should 
be interpreted by the historically constituted conditions of its environment of dependency on 
the one hand, and domination on the other. It may also be that the PPAs and other such one 
sided agreements induce particularly entreguista or ‘comprador’ forms of corruption, 
encouraging a ‘lumpenbourgeoise’ faction or tendency that allies with the multinationals to 
sacrifice national private production as well as the public interest.   
              
The second element that deserves closer consideration because of its general implications is 
the role of the international financial institutions, that is, the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB). Is corruption functional to multinational capital? Neo-
conservativism accepts some forms of administrative corruption as part of the necessary costs, 
the faux frais, of a domestic support alliance. It is primarily interested in state capture, in the 
sense the overall shaping of national policies in the multinationals’ interests. 
 
Privatisation and the threat of popular democracy 
 
The fight against corruption is also a fight for democratisation. There are two discourses in 
this respect. In the Colombian context the reforming conception of the active citizen is to 
invigilate the state of social right in which the state is the guarantor of domestic services, 
whether they be sourced from state or private corporations (Ulloa, 1997: 56-59). The 
EMCALI anti-privatisation struggle revealed another, more participatory conception. 
Primarily because it created a more direct social contract between service providers and 
consumers, requiring trust and accountability on both sides; a social contract that does not 
require the mediating intervention of the official state apparatus.  The superstructure of the 
official system was being by-passed, the more its intermediation had become corrupt and 
dysfunctional to service delivery, i.e. the more parasitic it became.  
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Is it an example too far? SINTRAEMCALI’s network of relations with other social 
movements has started to create counter hegemony to the power of the local state. Its partial 
victories have been at great cost and in any case a part of an ongoing social class struggle. 
 
The neo-liberal agenda is to strip the state of public services, while retaining its coercive 
power. The converse option, to strip the state of its coercive power while retaining its public 
services is more rarely posited. This fight to keeping the public sector, and to keep it clean of 
corruption, is an ethical class struggle, an advanced process that has pushed the envelope of 
possibilities to the limit.  It is an example of the potential of popular democracy as an 
emancipatory project. A popular democratic alliance to get rid of corruption is an alliance for 
social justice without declaring either for or against socialism. An alliance in which, contrary 
to the active citizenry model, the social movement is central rather than peripheral.  
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